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The paper compares the impact of corporate taxation and social insurance on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and unemployment. Four main results are derived: (i) the optimal size of the 
welfare state depends on the degree of risk-aversion and the unemployment rate as a measure 
of labor income risk. The unemployment rate partly reflects the country’s exposure to 
globalization; (ii) corporate taxation and social insurance have equivalent effects on 
unemployment and outbound FDI; (iii) while an increase in the corporate tax can raise 
corporate tax revenue, it is rather likely to worsen the government’s total fiscal stance. A 
corporate tax cut can thus be self-financing due to fiscal increasing returns in the presence of 
a large public sector; (iv) a corporate tax should be used to contribute to welfare state 
financing only in exceptional cases when job creation is excessive and unemployment is 
inefficiently low. These conditions are probably unlikely to hold in Europe’s generous 
welfare states with high structural unemployment rates. 
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Globalization puts pressure on the welfare state in high wage economies. In an inte-
grated world, globally acting companies ﬁnd it increasingly easy to access cheap labor in
developing countries to cut costs, or to move production closer to large markets rather
than exporting from the parent country. Firms can escape domestic wage pressure, for
example, by outsourcing labor intensive components to low wage economies or entirely
relocating production by means of outbound foreign direct investment (FDI). The policy
problem is that the need to raise tax revenue from mobile companies and the wage pres-
sure resulting from the welfare state reinforce these business strategies, thereby eroding
the tax base and the ﬁnancial viability of the welfare state. It is widely recognized that
the corporation tax as a source tax importantly aﬀects FDI by its impact on the location
choice of ﬁr m s . T h eh i g hr e p l a c e m e n ti n c o m ea v a i l a b l ei nt h ew e l f a r es t a t em i g h tp r o p
up wages and thereby similarly drive out business investment to alternative locations.
These arguments are supported by substantial empirical evidence. Among other fac-
tors inﬂuencing location choice, ﬁrms tend to locate production in countries with a low
corporate tax burden. Hines (1996) and Devereux and Griﬃth (1998) show that FDI is
sensitive to measures of average eﬀective corporate tax rates. Buettner and Ruf (2007)
similarly report that eﬀective marginal tax rates aﬀect the scale and eﬀective average rates
the location of multinational investment. Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008) ﬁnd
that countries compete over both average and marginal tax measures. Hines (1999), De-
vereux (2007) and OECD (2007) summarize the empirical evidence. The present analysis
emphasizes the impact of corporate taxes on aggregate investment via the entry and lo-
cation margins. Djankov et al. (2008) estimate that a 10 percent increase in the eﬀective
corporate tax rate reduces the investment to GDP ratio by 2 percentage points. More
importantly, the aggregate impact involves large eﬀects on the entry (entrepreneurship)
a n dF D Im a r g i n sw h i c ha r ea tt h ec e n t e ro ft h i sp a p e r .
On the other hand, wages importantly inﬂuence location decisions of multinationals,
possibly even more importantly than corporate taxes. By raising wages, the welfare
1state might induce outbound FDI much the same way as the corporate tax. Empirical
evidence suggests that welfare policy boosts wages and outsourcing in advanced economies.
Estimates of the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to unemployment beneﬁts
range from .11-.17 (Lancaster and Chesher, 1983) to values around .4 (Feldstein and
Poterba, 1984, Fishe, 1982, van den Berg, 1990). The high beneﬁts in Europe (replacement
rates are mostly 60% or more, see Nickell, 1997) thus signiﬁcantly inﬂate wages. Díaz-
Mora (2005) estimates that a one percent increase in ﬁrms’ domestic labor cost boosts the
volume of outsourcing by 0.3%. Investigating outsourcing of Austrian ﬁrms to Eastern
Europe, Egger and Egger (2003) ﬁnd that countries with lower unit labor costs attract
more outsourcing. Relative wage costs thus importantly inﬂuence the internationalization
strategies of ﬁrms. However, there seems to be little empirical evidence how wage taxes
and, in particular, social beneﬁts aﬀect FDI. Indirectly, the results in Desai, Foley and
Hines (2004) seem to be consistent with our arguments. They report that indirect taxes
have a substantial impact on FDI. Although they do not emphasize this interpretation,
indirect taxes also erode the workers’ real wage and could be shifted to employers. Closer
to the present analysis are the ﬁndings in Egger and Radulescu (2008) who explicitely
consider wage taxes and social security contributions and ﬁnd that eﬀective labor tax
rates signiﬁcantly aﬀect FDI, although less importantly than proﬁt taxes.
The theoretical literature has given little attention to the interaction of corporate
taxation and welfare state policies. This is the focus of the present paper which com-
pares the impact on unemployment, outbound FDI, income and welfare. Borrowing from
Keuschnigg (2008) and Keuschnigg and Ribi (2007), a model of search unemployment and
discrete location choice is proposed. It explains how outbound FDI responds to corpo-
rate taxes and social insurance. We also discuss the optimal size of the social insurance
scheme when private markets for unemployment insurance are missing, and whether the
corporate tax should be used to contribute to the ﬁnancing of the welfare state.
The main results of the paper are four: (i) The optimal size of the welfare state depends
on the degree of risk-aversion and the unemployment rate as a measure of labor income
2risk.1 T h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ep a r t l yr e ﬂects the country’s exposure to globalization. (ii)
Corporate taxation and social insurance have equivalent eﬀects on unemployment and
outbound FDI. (iii) While a tax increase can raise corporate tax revenue, it is rather
likely to worsen the government’s total ﬁscal stance. A corporate tax cut can thus be self-
ﬁnancing due to ﬁscal increasing returns in the spirit of Blanchard and Summers (1987)
if the savings in social spending and the growth in wage tax revenue are appropriately
t a k e ni n t oa c c o u n t .A ni s o l a t e dv i e wo nc o r p o r a t et a xr e v e n u ei sm u c ht o on a r r o w . 2 (iv)
A corporate tax should be used to contribute to welfare state ﬁnancing only in exceptional
cases. This last result might not be surprising, given the result of Gordon (1986), reﬂecting
the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) production eﬃciency theorem for a perfectly competitive
economy, that a source tax on proﬁts should not be used. However, in addition to missing
insurance markets, unemployment in our model results from labor market distortions.
Therefore, if ﬁr m sa r ee n d o w e dw i t hm u c hb a r g a i n i n gp o w e r ,l e a d i n gt oi n e ﬃciently low
unemployment, if the optimal size of the welfare state is small, and if the government has
a strong redistributional objective, a positive corporation tax could usefully complement
the tax ﬁnanced insurance scheme to curb excessive job creation. These conditions are
probably not very realistic in European countries with high structural unemployment
rates and large welfare states.
We now proceed in Section 2 to set up a simple model of involuntary unemployment
and outbound FDI. The basic function of the welfare state is to provide social insurance
of risk-averse workers, assuming that private unemployment insurance is not possible.
Section 3 derives comparative static results in response to policy shocks. Section 4 char-
acterizes the welfare optimal level of unemployment insurance and then discusses the role
of the corporate tax. Section 5 concludes.
1We relate social insurance to the unemployment risk such as in Chetty (2006) and the literature cited
there, and use a static model of job search similar to Boone and Bovenberg (2004).
2Blanchard and Summers (1987) pointed out that ﬁscal increasing returns are likely to emerge in the
presence of a large public sector. Tax cuts can even be self-ﬁnancing if they expand employment, thereby
strengthening the wage tax base and leading to savings in welfare spending for the unemployed.
32 The Model
A stylized, one period model of search unemployment and outbound FDI is proposed.
The government spends on social insurance and levies wage and corporate taxes to raise
revenue. The output good serves as numeraire. Firms are owned by risk-neutral investors.
There is free entry of ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm invests a ﬁxed amount of capital, decides on the
location of the production unit, and hires labor if production is set up at home. In
addition to variable hiring per ﬁrm, employment also depends on the number of ﬁrms
staying local, giving rise to intensive and extensive margins of labor demand. Workers
are risk-averse and subject to involuntary unemployment.
2.1 Workers and Firms
Workers: There is a mass one of risk-averse workers who are initially unemployed and
search for a job. Expected utility of a worker is
VL = e · u(w − t)+( 1− e) · u(b + h). (1)
An employed worker supplies one unit of labor, earns a wage w and pays a speciﬁcw a g e
tax t. Since labor supply on the job is ﬁxed, it does not matter whether the wage tax
is ad valorem or speciﬁc. Only the average tax rate t/w is economically relevant. When
unemployed, individuals collect beneﬁts b and enjoy the money equivalent value h of
leisure or home production (see also Blanchard and Tirole, 2008). With independent
risks, the ex ante probability e of getting employed is also the ex post employment rate,
and 1−e is the unemployment rate. Similarly, expected income ex ante is equal to average
income ex post, cL = e · (w − t)+( 1− e) · b.
The concavity of the utility function reﬂects risk aversion, u0 > 0 >u 00.W e u s e t h e
notation uE ≡ u(w − t) and uB ≡ u(b + h),a n ds i m i l a r l yu0
E and u0
B, where indices E
and B stand for the states of being employed or ‘on beneﬁts’. Taylor approximations
yield uB ≈ uE − (w − t − b − h)u0
E and u0
B ≈ u0
E − (w − t − b − h)u00
E =( 1 + χρ)u0
E
4and will be used later on. The relative income gap between labor market states is χ ≡
(w − t − b − h)/(w − t) and ρ ≡−(w − t)u00
E/u0
E is the degree of relative risk-aversion.
The worker’s job surplus as a share of the wage will be denoted by Ω ≡ 1−t∗−h/w where
t∗ ≡ (t + b)/w is the participation tax rate in the sense of Saez (2002) and Immervoll
et al. (2007). The job surplus indicates the worker’s income gain when switching from
unemployment into a job. The participation tax measures the total ﬁscal burden imposed
on the worker when accepting a job. Since it consists of the sum of the average wage tax
burden and the foregone social beneﬁts, it tends to be very high.
Firms: The timing of events is: (i) public policy; (ii) free entry of ﬁrms; (iii) choice
of production location and location speciﬁc investment; (iv) job search by workers and
locally operating ﬁrms; (v) matching and wage bargaining; (vi) production and income
payments. Entry means that investors incur a development or start-up cost r in stage (ii)
which allows them to draw an investment project of type q0 ∈ [0,1] from the distribution
G(q)=
R q
0 g(q0)dq0 where q0 is the project speciﬁc success probability of investment i.
The type q0 of the investment project reﬂects the ﬁrm’s luck in its innovation eﬀort.
After learning its type q0,t h eﬁrm chooses the plant location before the investment risk is
resolved. Investment succeeds or fails with probability q0 at the end of stage (iii). If the
ﬁrm fails, it closes down with all prior investments being lost.
To set up production, ﬁrms must thus incur a risky investment i. The size of this
investment is location speciﬁc and, importantly, is assumed to be larger abroad than at
home. The ﬁrm must spend additional resources to prepare foreign production, adjust
to diﬀerent regulations and institutions etc. For simplicity, we normalize to zero the
ﬁx e di n v e s t m e n ta th o m es ot h a ti is the diﬀerential investment required when setting
up production abroad. After success or failure is realized, ﬁrms are homogeneous within
each group (domestic or foreign located).3
3In new trade theory, see Helpman (2006) for a survey and Melitz (2003) for the original model, ﬁrms
are heterogeneous in their factor productivity. The probabilistic formulation adopted here is the key
simpliﬁcation compared to heterogeneous ﬁrm models in new trade theory.
5For simplicity, we assume that a ﬁrm consists of only one job which must be ﬁlled
with a suitable worker to start production. Due to mismatch of skills and required job
qualiﬁcations, hiring is successful only with probability m which is taken as given by
an individual ﬁrm but is endogenous in equilibrium, reﬂecting labor market tightness.
Ignoring other search costs, expected cash-ﬂow per domestic ﬁrm is
π =( y − w) · m, (2)
where y is output of the ﬁrm-worker match and y − w is the ﬁrm’s job rent. With
probability 1 − m, hiring is unsuccessful and before tax proﬁti sz e r o .
Alternatively to hiring and producing at home, ﬁrms can relocate, earning a proﬁt
abroad and repatriating dividends equal to πf. Given location speciﬁcs t a r t - u pc o s t ,a
domestic investor of type q0 sets up production locally if the expected net present value
exceeds the alternative value of locating abroad, (1 − τ)π ·q0 >π f ·q0 −i,w h e r eτ is the
corporate tax and πf is the cash-ﬂow and repatriated dividend of the foreign subsidiary,
net of the foreign corporation tax. We assume that the home government applies the
exemption method to avoid double taxation so that no further tax is levied on foreign
source proﬁts. The exemption method is the most commonly applied method in OECD
countries. We do not explicitely model the foreign economy but take πf to be larger than
net of tax cash-ﬂow earned at home. After all, the larger proﬁt opportunities of accessing
cheap labor in low wage economies, or of locating the plant close to foreign markets,
are prime motivations of outbound FDI. Of course, the larger proﬁt is available only if
investment is successful, and must be set against the extra cost of locating abroad. As
Figure 1 illustrates, it is thus too costly and not worthwhile for relatively unproﬁtable




, ∆π ≡ πf − (1 − τ)π>0. (3)
Prior to entry, ﬁrms expend innovation eﬀort to develop their product line, giving rise
to an entry cost r. Innovation results in an investment project of type q0 with probability
6g(q0), which will make it worthwhile to stay local or go international, depending on













Business failure results in s + sf < 1.A l lﬁrms must incur the entry cost but only part
of them survive to the production stage when the cash-ﬂow is generated.
i
q 1 local
' f qi π ⋅−
FDI
'( 1 ) q τπ ⋅−
Fig. 1: Firm Selection
There is a mass one of risk-neutral investors who are endowed with one unit of wealth
as well as entrepreneurial skills to create new ﬁrms. By way of contrast, workers are
risk-averse, lack the managerial ability to run a ﬁrm, and also have no own wealth. This
last assumption is consistent with the observed wealth concentration (see Wolﬀ, 1998, for
example). The expected value of a ﬁrm is πe =
R q
0 (1 − τ)πq0dG(q0)+
R 1
q (πfq0 − i)dG(q0).
To start a new ﬁrm, an entrepreneur must invest her entire wealth and, in addition, incurs
am a n a g e r i a le ﬀort cost. Investors diﬀer with respect to their entrepreneurial ability which
is uniformly distributed in n ∈ [0,1].A s s u m i n ga ne ﬀort cost r(n) such that r(0) = 0 and
r0 (n) > 0, implies that starting a ﬁrm is rather costly for types n → 1 with low ability
and high cost. Type n sets up a ﬁrm only if πe−r(n) > 1, where the alternative is not to
7invest her wealth and save the eﬀort cost. Interest is normalized to zero, making initial
wealth equal to end of period wealth without any income to be taxed. When not investing,
these agents simply live oﬀ their endowment. The marginal agent N is indiﬀerent between
investing her wealth or not. The indiﬀerence or free entry condition is
πe = s · (1 − τ)π + sf · πf − I =1+r(N). (5)
Taking account of business failure, the expected net present value must cover the ﬁxed
entry cost, πe > 1+r,r e ﬂecting the opportunity cost of capital and the initial research
and development eﬀort. Given a uniform distribution, the index for the marginal type is
equal to the mass of ﬁrms created. End of period wealth of those who have not invested is
1−N. Total investment cost of all ﬁrms started consists of capital N (one unit of wealth
invested per ﬁrm) and aggregate eﬀort cost R(N)=
R N
0 r(n)dn.W i t hN ﬁrms entering,
ap a r tsN survives and stays local, earning πN gross of tax, and sfN plants are moved
abroad. We also assume that capital investment is not deductible against corporate tax.
Hence, corporate tax revenue amounts to τπsN.
2.2 Labor and Product Markets
Labor Market: Firms and workers meet on a matching labor market. Search eﬀort of
workers is ﬁxed, leaving a mass 1 of job searchers. Each ﬁrm is endowed with one va-
cancy. Since only local ﬁrms hire in the domestic labor market, the number of vacancies
is sN. Job searchers and vacancies are matched according to e · 1=m(1,sN)=m · sN.
Skill mismatch leads to rationing subject to a standard linear homogeneous matching
technology. Only a fraction m of vacancies and e of workers get matched, the remaing
part remains idle, leading to involuntary unemployment and waisted investments. Using
an empirically validated Cobb Douglas technology M =1 η (sN)
1−η shows how the em-
ployment and hiring probabilities depend on labor market tightness θ = sN. A tighter
market, i.e. more demand per worker, boosts employment chances of workers but makes
8hiring by ﬁr m sm o r ed i ﬃcult:
e(θ)=θ
1−η,m (θ)=1 /θ
η,θ m = e. (6)
A successful match yields a rent to be shared by the worker ﬁrm pair. The wage
follows from standard Nash bargaining, w =a r gm a x [ u(w − t) − u(b + h)]
γ [y − w]
1−γ,
where γ reﬂects the worker’s bargaining power. The bargaining condition γu0
E ·(y − w)=
(1 − γ)(uE − uB) implicitely determines the gross wage. Using the approximation men-
tioned subsequent to (1), wage bargaining yields
w = γy +( 1− γ)(t + b + h). (7)
Job rents y−w =( 1− γ)(y − t − b − h) and w−t−b−h = γ (y − t − b − h) are a share










, Ω ≡ 1 − t
∗ − h/w, (8)
where t∗ is the participation tax rate, Ω i st h ew o r k e r ’ sj o bs u r p l u sp e ru n i to ft h ew a g e .
Similarly, (y − w)/w is the ﬁrm’s job surplus per wage unit.
Output Market: T h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti s
te + τπsN =( 1− e)b. (9)
Walras’ Law implies goods market clearing. Workers consume cL =( w − t)e + b(1 − e)
and investors cE =1 −N+πeN at the end of period. Adding up, using the ﬁscal constraint
and writing foreign source income (repatriated dividends) as Yf ≡ πfsfN −IN,o n eg e t s
C =1− N + πsN + Yf + we,w h e r eC = cL + cE.U s ee = msN and πsN =( y − w)e.
We thus obtain from the earlier equation the national income identity Y = C where
Y ≡ 1 − N + ye+ Y f is GNP, consisting of GDP ye+1− N plus foreign factor income.
Equilibrium is solved in terms of a wage tax t which balances the ﬁscal budget, and a
market tightness θ which clears the matching labor market.
93 Equilibrium in the Welfare State
Except when stated otherwise, we compute logarithmic changes relative to an initial
equilibrium, ˆ w = dw/w.I t i s c o n v e n i e n t t o d e ﬁne the change in (speciﬁc) taxes and
social spending relative to the gross wage, ˆ t ≡ dt/w and ˆ b ≡ db/w, while the relative
change in the corporate tax rate is deﬁned as ˆ τ = dτ/(1 − τ). The exogenously chosen
instruments are b and τ, the wage tax is endogenously set to balance the ﬁscal budget.
3.1 Wages, Proﬁts and Investment
We ﬁrst show how labor market tightness and the wage tax determine employment, wages,
proﬁts as well as national and foreign investment. Market tightness directly determines
employment by the matching probabilities in (6),
ˆ e =( 1− η) · ˆ θ, ˆ m = −η · ˆ θ, ˆ θ =ˆ s + ˆ N. (10)
The wage rate is set by decentralized wage bargaining. Bargaining partly shifts taxes
and beneﬁts to employers, leading to a higher gross wage. From (7),
ˆ w =( 1− γ) ·
³
ˆ b + ˆ t
´
. (11)
The expected gross proﬁt of a domestic plant reﬂects wage costs and ﬁrms’ hiring chances.
Substituting the results above and using (8) to replace ﬁrm rent yields
ˆ π =ˆ m −
w
y − w





ˆ b + ˆ t
´
. (12)
If producing abroad becomes more proﬁt a b l er e l a t i v et op r o d u c t i o na th o m e ,m o r e
ﬁrms will choose outbound FDI. To illustrate the consequences of globalization for the
welfare state, we allow for an exogenous increase in proﬁts πf from foreign production.
Obviously, improved prospects of accessing cheap labor or locating near large foreign
markets leads ﬁrms to opt for FDI more frequently. Linearizing (3) shows how the identity




· (ˆ π − ˆ τ) −
πf
∆π
· ˆ πf. (13)
10The expected value πe of a new ﬁrm depends importantly on selection eﬀects, as reﬂected




· ˆ q, ˆ sf = −
s
sf
· ˆ s. (14)
The impact of a change in q on expected proﬁt πe is zero to the ﬁrst order which
reﬂects the discrete choice condition (3), i.e. dπe/dq = {[(1 − τ)π − πf]q + i}g(q)=0 .
The scarcety of the managerial resource implies diminishing returns and makes entry less




· (ˆ π − ˆ τ)+
sfπf
πe




The case r0 = σ =0reﬂects perfectly elastic entry where the entry cost 1+r remains
ﬁxed. A high value of σ, in contrast, means inelastic entry (strongly decreasing returns).
3.2 Unemployment and Taxes
Labor Market: Labor market tightness depends on the number of locally built plants,
ˆ θ =ˆ s + ˆ N,w h e r eˆ s reﬂects location choice. Substituting (13-15) and rearranging yields
ˆ θ = μ · (ˆ π − ˆ τ)+μf · ˆ πf, (16)


















These elasticities capture the level eﬀect from free entry (the strength depends on σ)a n d
the selection eﬀect from location choice (the strength depends on q2g(q)/s). For example,
local production becoming more proﬁtable not only encourages overall entry investment
but also leads ﬁrms to establish a larger share of plants at home. An increase in foreign
proﬁts also boosts the overall expected return to investment and attracts entry but, on
the other hand, leads ﬁrms to locate more often abroad, making the overall eﬀect on θ
ambiguous. Obviously, the level eﬀect dominates if entry is suﬃciently elastic (σ is small,
11entry cost increases little with N), implying μf > 0. An increase in foreign proﬁts would
strongly encourage business creation and thereby lead to a larger number of local plants
even if the share of local plants in all investments declines.
Via entry and location choice, higher proﬁts lead to a tighter labor market. On the
other hand, a tighter market makes hiring more expensive and depresses proﬁtability
which works in the opposite direction. To obtain the equilibrium adjustment of labor
market tightness, we substitute (12) and rearrange,
(1 + μη) · ˆ θ = −(μγ/Ω) ·
³
ˆ t +ˆ b
´
− μ · ˆ τ + μf · ˆ πf. (17)
In raising wages, welfare policy not only reduces proﬁts and entry but also boosts out-
bound FDI. Market tightness falls. The labor market locus is negatively sloped.
Fiscal Balance: To analyze the public budget, consider ﬁrst the adjustment of the
corporate tax base. Noting θ = sN,w eh a v ef r o m( 1 2 )





ˆ b + ˆ t
´
. (18)
Fiscal balance in (9) requires (1 − e)wˆ b = ewˆ t + t∗ewˆ e +( 1− τ)πsNˆ τ + τπsN d πsN.
Substituting from above, dividing by ew and using πsN =( y − w)e together with (8) as
well as ˆ e =( 1− η)ˆ θ yields










e +( 1− γ)τ
¤
·ˆ b − (1 − τ)
1−γ
γ Ω · ˆ τ.
(19)
A tighter labor market is associated with higher employment and improves the ﬁscal
stance, allowing for a lower wage tax. The ﬁscal gain is proportional to the participation
tax rate t∗. On the other hand, a tighter labor market also reﬂe c t sm o r ee n t r y ,i . e . a
larger number of ﬁrms and corporate tax payers, which further allows to reduce the wage
tax. Higher beneﬁts directly raise social spending. In addition, beneﬁts also inﬂate wage
claims and thereby reduce proﬁts and ﬁrm entry which erodes the corporate tax base. For
both reasons, a higher wage tax is required.
12Equilibrium: The linearized ﬁs c a lc o n s t r a i n ti n( 1 9 )a n dt h el a b o rm a r k e tf r e ee n t r y
condition (17) form a simultaneous system in θ,t. Figure 2 illustrates. In particular,
the labor market locus must be steeper to satisfy the stability condition. Hence, the
determinant of the system, written in matrix form, must be positive,
∇≡1+μη − t
∗ (1 − η)μγ/Ω − τ (1 − γ)(1+μ) > 0. (20)
In fact, the determinant is guaranteed to be positive if taxes are small, leaving ∇ =1 + μη.
The solution for the equilibrium adjustment in market tightness and the wage tax is
ˆ θ =
1 − τ (1 − γ)
∇
μf · ˆ πf −
γμ
∇






ˆ t = −[t
∗ + τΩ(1 − γ)/γ](1− η)
μf
∇
· ˆ πf (21)
: −
∙
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Figure 2 illustrates stability of equilibrium and the adjustment to exogenous shocks.
The signs underneath the exogenous variables indicate how the budget and labor market
schedules are shifted in response to exogenous shocks.
θ







Fig. 2: Equilibrium in the Welfare State
13From now on, with the exception of section 3.3, we focus on national policy and
suppress the changes in foreign proﬁts πf. The equilibrium impact on labor market
tightness and the wage tax pin down all other variables. In particular, we are interested
how ﬁrm entry, national investment and FDI respond to public policy. Given constant
foreign proﬁts, entry in (15) is driven by changing domestic proﬁts net of corporate tax,










· (ˆ π − ˆ τ). (22)
In the present model, the level of national investment is equal to labor market tightness,
θ = sN,w h i c hi sr e l a t e di n( 1 6 )t on e to ft a xp r o ﬁta th o m e ,ˆ π−ˆ τ = ˆ θ/μ. The equilibrium
solution in (21) therefore directly reveals how the impact on national investment reﬂects
ﬁrm entry and location choice. The same holds for the level of FDI which we denote by
F = sfN.N o t i n gˆ sf = −(s/sf)ˆ s,w eﬁnd from (22)










· (ˆ π − ˆ τ). (23)
3.3 Globalization
Firms are able to better exploit business opportunities abroad and earn larger proﬁts from
foreign operations when the world economy becomes increasingly integrated. The imme-
diate eﬀect illustrated in Figure 1 is that a larger share of ﬁrms invests abroad rather than
at home. However, outbound FDI might not come at the expense of domestic employ-
ment. More proﬁtable foreign operations strengthen ﬁrm creation and entry which boosts
investment both at home and abroad. The elasticity μf in (16) shows that globalization
involves a positive level eﬀect on domestic employment but a negative selection eﬀect.
If entry responds very elastically to higher expected proﬁts πe, i.e. if σ is low, then the
level eﬀect clearly dominates, leaving a positive impact on employment. Figure 2 is based
on a positive elasticity μf which shifts the labor market locus to the right (not drawn).
Globalization boosts job creation and reduces unemployment.
14Tax revenues grow on two margins. Since ﬁrms create — on net — a larger number of
plants at home, the corporate tax base expands, raising tax revenues. Possibly even more
important, higher employment results in a twofold ﬁscal gain since the number of tax
payers rises while the number of welfare recipients shrinks. Hence, tax revenues grow in
proportion to the participation tax t∗. Given an improved ﬁscal stance, the government is
able to cut the wage tax which reinforces the positive eﬀects. The lower tax reduces wage
demands, strengthens domestic proﬁts, thereby partly reverses the trend to outbound FDI
and further boosts employment. In equilibrium, the wage tax falls and market tightness
rises. Despite of a declining gross wage, the net of tax wage grows due to a lower tax,
ˆ w−ˆ t = −γˆ t. If entry and thereby job creation are elastic, domestic workers unambiguously
gain in two ways. They not only reveive higher take home salaries, they also beneﬁtf r o m
a higher employment rate. By (A.3) in the Appendix, welfare of domestic workers rises.
However, if entry is inelastic (σ high, making μf negative), the results are reversed and
globalization harms domestic workers.
Proposition 1 (Globalization) When entry is elastic, domestic employment rises, the
wage tax can be reduced, and domestic workers gain in welfare. These results are reversed
when entry is inelastic.
4 Public Policy
4.1 Welfare State Reform
The consequences of expanding social spending ﬁnanced with a wage tax is illustrated in
Figure 2. As unemployment increases, the government must strongly raise taxes to ﬁnance
beneﬁt entitlements. The transmission mechanism is well understood from section 3.1.
More generous beneﬁts strengthen the workers’ fall back position. Further, the wage tax
gets partly shifted to employers as well. For these reasons, social protection inﬂates ﬁrms’
wage costs and reduces proﬁts from domestic activity. The expected return on business
15creation declines. Not only is total investment reduced, a larger part of it is shifted to
foreign locations. National employment falls which is reﬂected in a lower labor market
tightness in Figure 2. The total level of FDI, however, is ambiguous since the selection
eﬀect favors and the entry eﬀect subtracts from FDI.
The general equilibrium feedback reinforces this negative trend. As unemployment
picks up and more tax payers turn into welfare recipients, the government suﬀers a dou-
ble loss. It must spend more on social beneﬁts and, at the same time, collects less wage
tax revenue. The ﬁscal stance deteriorates in proportion to the participation tax t∗.F u r -
thermore, with less total investment and a larger part of it allocated to foreign locations,
both the level and selection eﬀects work to erode the national corporate tax base. The
government must thus raise the wage tax even more to balance the budget. In the end,
unemployment is up, net wages decline, and the business sector not only scales down total
investment but increasingly opts for outbound FDI.
On the positive side, workers enjoy better protection against job losses when beneﬁts
are more generous. Providing insurance to risk-averse individuals in the face of unin-
surable labor income risk and missing private markets is a fundamental reason for the
existence of the welfare state. At least a small l e v e lo fs o c i a li n s u r a n c ei sw e l f a r ei n c r e a s -
ing. Setting all taxes to zero in the initial equilibrium and introducing a small social
insurance scheme raises the wage tax in (21) by ˆ t = 1−e
e ·ˆ b,w h e r e∇ =1+μη in this case.
Substituting this into the welfare eﬀect noted in (A.2) yields
ˆ VL =
∙











The ﬁrst term reﬂects the gains from insurance where ρ is the degree of relative risk-
aversion, χ measures the income gap between work and unemployment, and 1 − e is the
unemployment rate and measures the degree of risk. The gains from insurance arise be-
cause of missing markets. In addition, workers might gain or loose from redistributional
eﬀects. Wage bargaining boosts the gross wage and thereby shifts taxes and unemploy-
ment beneﬁts to ﬁrms. A higher wage clearly beneﬁts workers and reduces the job rent
16of ﬁrms. Welfare policy thus harms investors, see (A.4) which is negative since tightness
declines. Equation (A.6) shows that the redistribution exactly cancels in the aggregate
if the so-called ‘Hosios condition’ γ = η is fulﬁlled. In general, the unemployment rate
in a search labor market could be too high or too low, compared to the socially optimal
rate because the bargaining power of workers and ﬁr m si sn o ta l i g n e dw i t ht h e i rr e l a t i v e
eﬀectiveness in job search (Hosios, 1990). If the bargaining power satisﬁes the Hosios
condition, the equilibrium unemployment rate is not distorted. In this case, workers get
as h a r eγ of the joint surplus from job creation. This share exactly corresponds to their
eﬀectiveness in creating the surplus which is measured by the elasticity η of the matching
function. Intuitively, workers get only a share of the joint surplus but also contribute only
the same share to the creation of it. The labor market is eﬃcient, and the welfare gains
purely reﬂect the gains from insurance. Hence, in (A.6), the excess burden of welfare
policy is zero, Γ = γ − η =0in the absence of government.
In the benchmark case of γ = η, workers gain in proportion to η∗ − η>0 in (24)
which just matches the corresponding loss of investors, so that redistribution cancels in
the aggregate, leaving Γ =0in (A.6). However, if workers are weak (Γ = γ − η<0),
corresponding to an equilibrium with an ineﬃciently low unemployment rate, the total
welfare gains from introducing unemployment insurance in (A.6) would become larger
than the pure gains from insurance. The policy would indirectly strengthen workers’
bargaining power via their fall back position in wage negotiations and bring the overly
low unemployment rate closer to the eﬃcient level. However, in an economy with a strong
bargaining position of workers (Γ > 0) and an overly high unemployment rate, the welfare
gains from insurance are partly oﬀset by the welfare losses from reduced eﬃciency of the
search equilibrium.
In considering the optimal size of welfare policy, one must evaluate the consequences
for the entire population of workers and investors. Hence, an optimal unemployment in-
s u r a n c es c h e m em u s tb eb a s e do n( A . 6 )r a t h e rt h a n( 2 4 ) .W h e nl a b o rm a r k e td i s t o r t i o n s
are not too large (γ = η), social spending should be expanded until the gains from insur-
17ance are oﬀset by the increasing excess burden from tax ﬁnancing. It is now important to
evaluate the comparative static eﬀects in the presence of positive tax rates, giving rise to
tax base eﬀects. Substituting again the equilibrium tax rate into the total welfare eﬀect,
and keeping τ constant, eventually yields (see A.6)
ˆ V =[ ( 1− e)χρ − Γ] ·ˆ b, Γ ≡
h
t
∗ · (1 − η)
γ
Ω




Optimal policy must balance the gains from insurance with the excess burden of welfare
state ﬁnancing, (1 − e)χρ = Γ. The excess burden shows up not only in the welfare system
(proportional to the participation tax t∗) but also in the corporate tax (proportional
to the rate τ). Since social insurance pushes up wages, it erodes proﬁt per domestic
ﬁrm, the number of ﬁrms located at home (reduced entry and a shift towards FDI both
reduce national investment) and thereby erodes corporate tax revenue. The excess burden
is augmented or reduced by the last term in Γ,r e ﬂecting the potential labor market
distortions from search externalities.
Proposition 2 (Welfare State) Expanding the welfare state boosts wages, cuts proﬁts
and reduces national investment and job creation due to reduced entry and a shift towards
FDI. Unemployment rises. If the labor market is close to eﬃcient (γ = η), a small insur-
ance scheme creates ﬁrst order gains from insurance. The scheme is optimally expanded
until the gains from insurance are oﬀset by the excess burden of welfare state ﬁnancing.
4.2 Corporate Taxation
For given gross proﬁts which do not directly depend on the corporate tax, the immediate
impact of the tax is to reduce net proﬁts from local production which leads ﬁrms to
shift towards FDI. Figure 1 illustrates by rotating down the line q0 · (1 − τ)π.A l o w e r
net proﬁt from local production also reduces expected proﬁt πe and, thereby, reduces
ﬁrm entry. Both the selection eﬀect towards FDI and the reduced entry diminish local
job creation, leading to more unemployment. In equilibrium, labor market tightness
18unambiguously declines. In consequence, as stated in (22), both ﬁrm entry and the share
of local investments fall. In constrast, the level of outbound FDI in (23) remains inherently
ambiguous, reﬂecting a negative entry and a positive selection eﬀect.
W h i l ea ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec o r p o r a t et a xr a t ed e ﬁnitely raises corporate tax revenue, the
total impact on the ﬁscal stance is less clear when the government must also levy wage
taxes to ﬁnance social spending. For each worker ending up unemployed, the government
looses net tax revenue (net of social spending) in proportion to the participation tax
t∗. While the corporate tax raises more corporate tax revenue (as long as the term
1+μη − τ (1 + μ) in (21) is positive which is the case if the tax rate is not too large), it
also triggers substantial ﬁscal losses in wage tax revenue and inﬂates welfare spending. For
this reason, the total impact of a higher corporate tax on the ﬁscal stance is ambiguous
ap r i o r i .I ft h en e te ﬀect is to improve the ﬁscal stance, the wage tax may be cut which
leads to wage concession, thereby strengthens proﬁts, and partly reverses the negative
direct eﬀects on national investment. In Figure 2, the direct eﬀect shifts the labor market
locus to the left, the feedback eﬀect shifts the budget line down. However, if the ﬁscal
stance deteriorates, the feedback eﬀect shifts up the budget line and magniﬁes the negative
consequences of a higher corporate tax.
Proposition 3 (Corporate Tax) The corporate tax reduces net of tax proﬁtf r o md o -
mestic plants, impairs ﬁrm entry and leads to a relocation of investment towards foreign
destinations. Unemployment rises due to a strong decline in national investment and job
creation. The total ﬁscal stance may improve or deteriorate, leading to an ambiguous
adjustment in the wage tax.
Both corporate taxation and unemployment insurance add to unemployment. To
compare the relative impact of the two policies on the unemployment rate, we now combine
them in a way that is just oﬀsetting. We ask the following question: if we raise the
corporation tax by ˆ τ percent, by how much do we need to reduce beneﬁts to prevent an
increase in unemployment? Since employment is proportional to market tightness, we can
19combine the policy changes in (21) in a way that keeps θ and, thus, the unemployment
rate constant. Using Ω ≡ 1 − t∗ − h/w yields
ˆ b = −(1 − t
∗ − h/w)e · ˆ τ ⇒ ˆ e =( 1− η) · ˆ θ =0 . (26)
Although the model is surely too stylized to give a reliable evaluation of the issue,
it does point to an important trade-oﬀ. Taking the model literally, one can calibrate
the employment rate and participation tax rate to attain realistic values. Suppose τ =0
initially, then the budget implies et∗ = b/w. If unemployment is at 10% (e =9 /10)a n dt h e
replacement rate is 1/2, then a participation tax of t∗ = b/(we)=5 /9 is required, around
5 6 % .I ft h em o n e t a r yv a l u a t i o no fl e i s u r ed u r i n gu n e m p l o y m e n tw e r ez e r o( h =0 ), then
(1 − t∗)e =2 /5. If we introduced a corporation tax with a rate of 10% (ˆ τ = dτ =1 /10),
then one would need to cut the replacement rate by ˆ b = db/w = −2/50 or 4 percentage
points, from 50% to 46%, to oﬀset the impact of the corporation tax. While there is
always a trade-oﬀ between a higher corporate tax and larger beneﬁts, the magnitude of
this trade-oﬀ is reduced if leisure value during unemployment were positive.4
Proposition 4 (Relative Impact on Unemployment) Raising the corporate tax by
ˆ τ percent and beneﬁts by ˆ b =( 1 − t∗ − h/w)e · ˆ τ percent have the same eﬀect on the
unemployment rate.
While it is recognized that the average corporate tax rate signiﬁcantly aﬀects FDI,
the potential of the welfare state to inﬂuence FDI ﬂows was not investigated to the same
extent. How does the corporation tax compare with the welfare state to inﬂuence FDI?
FDI reﬂects both a level (entry) and a composition eﬀect. Equation (23) shows that these
two eﬀects tend to oﬀset each other so that national policy in general has an ambiguous
impact on outbound FDI. FDI adjusts in proportion to net of tax proﬁta th o m ew h i c h
changes in line with labor market tightness, ˆ π − ˆ τ = ˆ θ/μ in (16). If ﬁrm entry is very
4On the other hand, unemployed workers might suﬀer from social stigma which might be associated
with a negative value of h.
20elastic (σ → 0), the entry eﬀect clearly dominates and FDI increases whenever ﬁrms earn
larger net of tax proﬁt from home operations. If entry is inelastic (σ large), the selection
eﬀect dominates and FDI declines in response to the same shock. Whatever the sign of the
net eﬀect, the same policy combination that keeps θ and, thus, domestic unemployment
constant, also keeps net of tax proﬁt sa n do u t b o u n dF D Ic o n s t a n t .
Proposition 5 (Relative Impact on FDI) Raising the corporate tax by ˆ τ percent and
beneﬁts by ˆ b =( 1− t∗ − h/w)e · ˆ τ percent have the same eﬀect on outbound FDI.
Given missing insurance markets, the government should always protect workers and
establish a welfare state. Hence, the corporation tax should be evaluated in the presence
of other taxes and spending. We now investigate the ambiguity noted in Proposition
3 and clarify the conditions under which a higher corporate tax is indeed able to im-
prove the ﬁscal stance. Evaluating (21) and using the deﬁnition of η∗ in (24), leading to














· ˆ τ. (27)
Inserting the deﬁnition of Ω =1− t∗ − h/w gives the following result:
Proposition 6 (Corporation Tax and Fiscal Stance) Introducing a small corporate
tax deteriorates the ﬁscal stance if the participation tax rate is large,
t









Suppose that workers are endowed with high bargaining power such that γ = η∗ >η ,
and the unemployment rate is ineﬃciently high. Then α =1holds. Further assume that
τ =0and the value of home production h which raises reservation wages beyond the
inﬂuence of ﬁscal variables, is zero as well. In this case, a small corporate tax reduces
the ﬁscal stance if the participation tax rate is larger than a half (t∗ > 1/2). Immervoll
et al. (2007) show that participation tax rates are rather high and larger than 50% in
21most European countries with a large welfare state.5 T h ec o n d i t i o nc o u l dt h u se a s i l yb e
fulﬁlled in a country with high unemployment, meaning that an increase in the tax rate,
although raising more corporation tax, could potentially worsen the total ﬁscal stance.
The upshot is that one must take into account the wage tax revenue and social spending
if one wants to evaluate the corporation tax in the welfare state. Given that the largest
part of tax revenue in many countries is collected from wage income, and the largest part
of public spending is for social purposes, the result could be important.
The condition is even more likely to be fulﬁlled if the value of home production or
the money equivalent value of leisure (see Blanchard and Tirole, 2008) is positive, and
if the corporate tax rate is positive. Home production inﬂates reservation wages beyond
the inﬂuence of the wage tax and unemployment beneﬁts. The resulting wage demands
squeeze proﬁts from domestic production and thereby impair national investment and job
creation, resulting in a high unemployment rate. A further increase in unemployment due
to a rise in the corporate tax would be particularly costly in terms of net tax revenue
(wage tax minus social spending). Finally, the condition is more likely to hold when the
bargaining power of workers and, therefore, unemployment is ineﬃciently high. With
unemployment approaching the eﬃcient level on account of a lower bargaining power
(γ → η), the condition is somewhat less likely to be fulﬁlled, i.e. the threshold rate of the
participation tax rises.
A ni m p o r t a n ti s s u ei sw h e t h e rt h ec o r p o r a te tax should be used at all to contribute
to welfare state ﬁnancing when participation tax rates are high and labor market dis-
tortions are potentially large. One might conclude that a small corporate tax could be
welfare increasing since its revenue can be used to cut the typically large participation
t a x . G i v e nt h er e s u l t so nt h eﬁscal stance, it seems unlikely, although not impossible,
that the corporate tax could play a useful role in the welfare state. First note, that on
pure eﬃciency grounds, a corporate tax should never be used, since ˆ V = −ΓΩe · ˆ τ in
(A.6). Since a preexisting welfare state to insure workers implies Γ > 0,e v e nas m a l l
5The preceding section identiﬁes the economic parameters that call for a large or small welfare state.
22corporate tax rate unambiguously reduces aggregate welfare. Looking at distributional
eﬀects, investors always loose from the tax, ˆ VE < 0 in (A.4) since the tax reduces market
tightness. Using the corporate tax to complement the wage tax could then only be justi-
ﬁed on distributional grounds if it raises worker welfare. Evaluating (A.2) at τ =0and
substituting the solution of the wage tax rate in (21) yields
ˆ VL =
[1 − γ +( η − γ)μ]Ω − t∗ · (1 − η)μγ
∇
e · ˆ τ. (29)
If bargaining power is high such that γ = η∗ >η ,t h ec o e ﬃcient of Ω becomes zero,
1 − γ +( η − γ)μ =0 , leaving a negative welfare eﬀect on workers. If workers are also
very risk-averse, the scale of the insurance scheme should be large, leading to a high
participation tax t∗. Hence, if workers’ bargaining power is strong, the introduction of
even a small corporate tax would be a Pareto inferior policy change. So the corporate
tax should not be used to contribute to welfare state ﬁnancing, even if the participation
tax is very high, pointing to a high tax distortion in wage taxation. But because the
participation tax is high, the corporate tax also involves a very high excess burden which
is seen not in the erosion of the corporate tax base but elsewhere in the system. It destroys
jobs and thereby causes large ﬁscal losses due to lower wage tax revenue and inﬂated social
spending. For this reason, the corporate tax involves a high excess burden even if its rate
is small or zero.
A case for a positive corporate tax rate can only be constructed if the workers’ bar-
gaining power is very weak, making the ﬁrst term in the numerator positive while the
coeﬃcient of t∗ is reduced in size. Under these conditions, the unemployment rate is
ineﬃciently low and the labor market distortion, as measured by the gap η − γ,i sr e l a -
tively large. A low unemployment rate also means that little labor income risk is to be
insured. If, in addition, the workers’ risk-aversion is small, there is little demand for social
insurance. In consequence, the beneﬁt level, the wage tax and, thus, the participation
tax rate are small. The welfare state reduces entry and national job creation and thereby
relaxes market tightness, as is required in an equilibrium with η>γ . However, when
the optimal size of the welfare state is relatively small, it might not be enough to oﬀset
23the labor market distortion. For eﬃciency reasons alone, see (A.6), the government could
then additionally levy a corporate tax to relax the labor market and restore an eﬃcient
unemployment rate. The gains accrue to workers while investors always loose. This sce-
nario would then justify a positive corporate tax under a suﬃciently high redistribution
objective.
Proposition 7 (Corporate Tax and Welfare) If the unemployment rate is ineﬃ-
ciently high, even a small corporate tax yields Pareto inferior welfare changes. A positive
tax rate could possibly be rationalized under strong redistributional objectives when the
unemployment rate is ineﬃciently low and there is little demand for social insurance.
T h ec a s ef o rl e v y i n gac o r p o r a t et a xs e e m sr a t h e rw e a k . I ti sn o te v e ns u r et h a ti t
helps to improve the ﬁscal stance when the government needs to operate a large welfare
state to provide social insurance. The increase in corporate tax revenue might be smaller
than the ﬁs c a ll o s s e st h a tr e s u l tf r o mi n ﬂated social spending and declining wage taxes.
From a welfare theoretic point of view, a corporate tax could possibly be rationalized in an
economy with little demand for social insurance due to low risk-aversion and an excessively
low unemployment rate resulting from an overly strong bargaining position of ﬁrms. The
role of the corporate tax is then to reduce excessive job creation, and not so much in
generating revenue to reduce other distorting taxes. The case for using the corporate
tax is further advanced when there is a strong desire to redistribute from investors with
ﬁn a n c i a lw e a l t ht ow o r k e r ss u b j e c tt ow a g ei n c o m er i s k . I tm i g h tb ed o u b t e dt h a tt h i s
potential function of the corporate tax is particularly relevant in reality. In any case, the
condition is unlikely to be fulﬁlled when risk aversion and the demand for insurance are
large so that the government willingly accepts a high participation tax rate. Using the
corporate tax will then even harm the workers.
245C o n c l u s i o n s
A major problem of the welfare state is the delocation of investment and the resulting
loss of jobs. The purpose of the paper was to compare the consequences for employment
and outbound FDI of corporate and labor taxes in the welfare state. The main results
are that these policies are largely equivalent in their impact on unemployment and FDI.
Based on an admittedly overly stylized back of the envelope calculation, we found that
an increase in the corporate tax by 10 percentage points might have the same impact
on unemployment and FDI than an increase in the replacement rate of unemployment
insurance by 4 percentage points. Another result is that the corporate tax, while raising
corporate tax revenue, could easily worsen a country’s overall ﬁscal stance. By raising
unemployment, it inﬂates social spending and erodes wage tax revenue. The excess burden
of the corporate tax is therefore only to a minor extent due to the erosion of the corporate
tax base but rather lies in the inﬂated cost of the welfare state. Even if it does raise
enough revenue to improve the overall ﬁscal stance, the case for using the corporate tax
in an advanced welfare state seems very weak. Based on an explicit welfare analysis, we
found that the corporate tax could play a useful role only if social insurance is optimally
kept at a small scale, e.g. because of small risk-aversion, if the labor market is distorted
towards excessive job creation, and if there is a strong desire to redistribute from investors
to workers. One might conclude that these conditions are hardly fulﬁlled in European
economies with high structural unemployment rates and a large welfare state.
Appendix: Welfare Analysis
Workers: Expected utility changes by dVL =( uE − uB)de+eu0
E (dw − dt)+(1 − e)u0
Bdb.
Divide by w and use the Taylor approximations noted in (1). Note the deﬁnition of the
participation tax t∗ and substitute wage adjustment ˆ w =( 1− γ)
³
ˆ b + ˆ t
´
to get the wel-
fare change. In dividing by u0
E, we express the welfare change in income equivalent units.


















E is the marginal rate of substitution of income between good and bad
states. Use u0
B/u0
E =1+χρ and replace ˆ e =( 1− η)ˆ θ from the labor market locus (17),
ˆ VL =
∙















1+μ < 1 is deﬁned in (24).
To see how globalization aﬀects worker welfare, substitute the equilibrium solution of
the wage tax in (21). For example, if entry is elastic and μf > 0, globalization allows to
cut the wage tax so that welfare of domestic workers rises (Proposition 1),
ˆ VL = Ω
1 − η
1+μη
μfe · ˆ πf −
γ
η∗e · ˆ t>0. (A.3)
Investors: Entrepreneurs receive proﬁt income. Since inframarginal ﬁrms yield a strictly
positive surplus, welfare of investors changes as well. Utility of type n is ve = πe − r(n),
giving VE =1−N +πeN −R(N) in total, where R(N)=
R N
0 r(n)dn. Since the surplus
o ft h em a r g i n a li n v e s t o ri sz e r od u et of r e ee ntry, more entry doesn’t marginally change
welfare, ceteris paribus, dVE/dN = πe−1−r =0 .H o w e v e r ,p r o ﬁts of inframarginal ﬁrms
are aﬀected in equilibrium, and these changes are related to entry by πe =1+r(N),
yielding ˆ πe = σ ˆ N. The income equivalent welfare change of investors is, thus, in percent
of wage income, ˆ VE ≡ dVE/w =( πeN/w)ˆ πe =( πeN/w)σ ˆ N. Entry is given in (22), and
(16) shows how entry and investor welfare change with market tightness. Since the fol-
lowing analysis is concerned with public policy only, we set ˆ πf =0 .U s eπsN =( y − w)e
as well as (8) in the ﬁrst term to get





e · ˆ θ. (A.4)
26Aggregate Welfare: The total welfare eﬀe c ta d d st h ei n c o m ee q u i v a l e n tw e l f a r ec h a n g e s
of risk-averse workers and risk-neutral investors, dV = dVL/u0
E + dVE,o rˆ V ≡ ˆ VL + ˆ VE,
if expressing it in percent of wage income. Adding up (A.2) and (A.4) yields (ˆ πf is no
longer needed and omitted),
ˆ V =
∙















The ﬁnal form obtains by substituting the equilibrium solutions in (21). Using the deter-
minant in (20) and η∗ in (24), yields, after some tedious rearrangements,




∗ (1 − η)
γ
Ω




The coeﬃcient Γ is a measure of the excess burden, and is zero in the absence of govern-
ment and other market distortions (γ = η and t = b = τ =0 ).
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